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This article uses intersectionality as an analytical tool to explore struggles for institutional
space in policy processes in two ostensibly contrasting contexts: “republican” France and
the “multicultural” United Kingdom. Specifically, the article undertakes within-case
analysis of three policy processes. In France, we discuss the debate over laı¨cite´, or
secularism, the subsequent formulation of the March 2004 law banning the wearing of
religious signs in state schools, and the creation of the High Authority for the Fight
Against Discrimination (HALDE). In the UK, we examine the problem definitions,
language, and subject positions constructed by the 2008 Single Equality Bill. The result
of these analyses is that institutional actors employ similar (though not identical)
practices in relation to intersections, which have similar outcomes for minority groups on
either side of the English Channel. Through what we term a “logic of separation,”
institutional actors severely curtail the “institutional space” available to minority ethnic
groups to make complex and intersectional social justice claims. Even though France
and the UK are often portrayed as opposites with regard to constructions of citizenship,
we argue that these seemingly differing traditions of citizenship end up having a similar
effect of misrecognizing minority women and men’s experiences and demands.
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INTRODUCTION
“I ntersectionality” refers to the study of the simultaneous andinteracting effects of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and
national origin as categories of difference. This article uses
intersectionality as an analytical tool to explore struggles for institutional
space in social policy processes in two contexts: republican France and
the multicultural United Kingdom. We begin by first explaining our
interest in intersectionality and current advances in its study in policy
processes, and demonstrate the way our approach builds on existing
work. We then outline the ways in which “republican” France and the
“multicultural” UK are traditionally considered to be “opposites” with
regard to the public role of difference and its recognition, and we
contrast this understanding with an emerging literature that deconstructs
this opposition. Then, we undertake within-case analysis of two moments
of institutional separation, focusing on two policy processes in France
and one in the UK.
In France, we first explore the policy frameworks for inte´gration and
antidiscrimination in the context of a republican model, which requires
that “private” identity not play a “political” role in the public sphere.
The analysis will demonstrate that the separation of inte´gration from the
fight against discrimination depoliticizes claims that challenge the nature
of the French Republic and may silence the intersectional claims of
women and men simultaneously experiencing multiple forms of
discrimination. In the UK, we analyze the language, problem definitions
and subject positions constructed in the process of formulating the
Single Equality Bill, which achieved Royal Assent in April 2010. While
in the French case claims are depoliticized, here the issue appears to be
that of definition: “equality” is named and acted upon in specific ways
that, in turn, make it difficult to recognize the intersection of gender,
ethnicity, and other salient sources of inequality. Focusing on the new
Single Equality Bill, this section will demonstrate that institutional
processes and actors characterize these multiple sources of inequality as
independent and unconnected social phenomena, impeding policy that
recognizes and combats the simultaneous and interacting sources of
discrimination that shape the lives of minority women and men.
The conclusion that emerges from this comparison of institutional space
in France and the UK is that although the “models” for accommodating
difference in the public sphere and in institutions are different and even
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traditionally considered as opposites, and institutional actors and policy
processes are by no means identical, institutions fail to recognize
intersections in similar ways. Through a process of misrecognition,
intersecting axes of disadvantage are separated and in some cases even
silenced. The result is that complex demands for equality can be difficult
to make and to be recognized in each case.
Why Intersectionality?
The idea of intersectionality forces us to confront and think about women
and men in a complex and heterogeneous way. Exploring how gender,
ethnicity, race, class, disability, age, religion, and sexuality interact in
different ways, depending on different cultural contexts, is crucial in
seeking to construct a state that supports and recognizes multiple social
justice claims. Intersectionality is a powerful way of understanding the
differing outcomes between different types of women and men (for
example see Crenshaw 1991; Hancock 2007a; 2007b; Hill Collins 1990;
Jordan-Zachery 2007).
We focus on intersectionality in relation to social structures, specifically
the ways in which institutions emphasize some social structures at the
expense of others, rather than individual identity. As S. Laurel Weldon
(2006, 239) notes in her elaboration on the work of Iris Young: “[W]e
need a structural account of politics because we need to be able to
criticize social structures. . .. Such macro level analysis need not imply
shared identities across gender, race or class groups.” This is not to
suggest that the study of individual identity does not have value.
However, it does not enable us to undertake comparison of institutional
practices that directly and indirectly impact on intersecting axes of
gender, race, religion, and ethnicity in two very different cultural, social,
and political contexts. Furthermore, comparative analysis “is key to
illuminating the range of variation in structures of gender, race, class and
other axes of domination, the ways in which these structures interact,
and the wide array of strategies for resistance and reform” (Weldon 2006,
247). While variation is certainly present in the results of our analysis, we
will underscore the similarity of the processes at work despite ostensible
differences in the two contexts we examine.
When intersectionality is operationalized, it is important not to
problematize the very groups we seek to recognize. We do not think
minority women and men are the problem. Instead, we focus on
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institutions that ought to be accommodating multiple differences, in other
words, upon institutional practices rather than the dynamics of identity
formation and construction. We therefore seek to compare the processes
through which policy actors and institutions do or do not recognize and
address intersections and intersecting claims in establishing law and
policy, rather than focusing exclusively on the outcomes of policies for
individuals with intersecting identities.
Intersectionality and Policy Processes
Our approach differs from current work on the institutionalization of
intersectionality in its focus on the process of accommodating
intersectional claim making, rather than on evaluating the policy
outcomes of recognizing intersectionality (for example, see Bagilhole
2009; Lombardo and Verloo 2009; Squires 2007, 2008; Verloo 2006).
Current work appears to be concerned with the successes and challenges
of institutional actors in recognizing intersecting inequalities. This work
is important as it suggests that “institutions have a potential impact on
triggering or discouraging territorial mechanisms that limit civil society’s
cooperation on inequalities” (Lombardo and Verloo 2009, 2). Promoting
multiple social justice claims or intersectionality may inadvertently
encourage or promote competition between different groups as they vie
for recognition and decision-making power within institutional spaces.
Indeed, Judith Squires (2007) notes that this could lead to competition
reminiscent of what Elizabeth Martinez terms the “oppression
Olympics” (Martinez 1993 discussed in Hancock 2007b, 250), where
groups compete for the mantle of “most oppressed” in order to gain the
attention and political support of dominant groups as they pursue policy
remedies, leaving the overall system of stratification unchanged. In
addition, Squires (2008) argues that in the name of intersectionality,
institutional actors may seek to avoid difficult political choices needed
for structural reform and, instead, focus on less contentious and less
effective individualized policy measures to tackle multiple discrimination
under the rubric of ‘diversity’. As we shall see, the process of developing
the Single Equality Bill in the UK appears to reflect some of Squires’s
concerns.
While it is important to understand the potential impact of these
institutional outcomes on the ability to recognize intersectional claims,
we are interested in exploring the earlier process of the creation of
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institutional space. In this article, we explore two social policy processes
explicitly focused on equality and social justice and analyze how the
process enacts its self-defined function of redressing equality issues. A
comparison of the institutional space that is created by policymakers and
policy processes can help us understand how intersections are silenced
or privileged, and also sheds light on how intersectional claims can
mutate into competing claims due to the “sorting” or “separating”
influences of official state actors. A focus on this space can help
campaigners and researchers think about the process of coalition
building, negotiation, and claim making to render struggles for social
justice more plural, inclusive, and effective.
THE FRENCH AND UK MODELS: CLICHE´D OPPOSITES?
The treatment of difference in the public sphere in France and the UK is
traditionally considered to be diametrically opposed. Whereas in France
the republican model requires that private identity not play a political
role in the public sphere, the UK approach has been explicitly
multicultural (though increasingly under fire).
Laı¨cite´, which can only be roughly translated as “secularism,” acts as an
organizing principle of the French Republic, codifying what is acceptable
and unacceptable in public space. The French republican model of
inte´gration is expressly assimilatory, with pluralism explicitly disavowed
as a public good (Levinson 1997, 335). The underlying ideology is
difference blindness: Each citizen has the same rights and
responsibilities in public and is an equal, abstract entity before the law.
Specific identities (such as cultural identities) are denied in the public
sphere; they are to play only a private role. Integration occurs on the
basis of voluntary adhesion to the secular values of the political
community, through individual citizenship (which is accessed through
birth (droit du sol), rather than on the basis of group identification (droit
du sang).
For staunch defenders of the republican “model,” such as sociologist
Dominique Schnapper, public accommodation of cultural pluralism
must be resisted (1994). Transcendence of particular belonging through
the idea and institutions of citizenship, particularly the separation of
church and state, is the only political idea that can organize a society
where people with different historical references, religions, and
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conditions of life can live together and feel that their dignity is recognized.
According to Schnapper (1994, 10), “Public freedoms guarantee the right
to freely practice one’s religion or to use one’s language. But, at the same
time, these specificities must not form the basis of a particular political
identity, recognized as such within public space. This space must remain
the site of political unity and a common political project.”
Adrian Favell describes this kind of position as “neo-republicanism,” a
nostalgia for the Third Republic involving a mythical retelling (2001,
64–85). Rules of inte´gration can be set in strongly republican,
citizenship-based terms because they directly continue the nation
building of the Third Republic. The “particularity” of France’s political
and cultural heritage is seen as the most important determining factor of
the concerns and emphasis of present-day immigration policy, despite
evidence of convergent policy practice cross-nationally, the breaking
down of national models, and the effect of transnational institutions and
discourses (Favell 2001, 45–46).
Legal membership is the basis for autonomy and access to the public
sphere, and the political community takes place under republican terms.
“Proper” participation within the political community is defined as
transcending private interests. This is part of the normative project of
inte´gration that ensures both national unity and the creation of
autonomous citizens who identify their interest with the political sphere
(Favell 2001, 85).
In the UK, citizens’ relationships with and obligation to the state and
civil society are orientated differently. Traditionally, there has been no
fixed idea of what “Britishness” is and how citizenship in Britain should
be practiced (Favell 2001; Goulbourne 1991). Since the UK is not a
single entity but a collection of the rival substates of England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland, “British citizenship” is neither a stable
nor unproblematic idea. Furthermore, the idea of citizenship is also
problematized by the British imperial legacy of conferring automatic
legal status to any subject born in the Commonwealth (Hansen 2000).
Thus, citizenship in Britain has been more concerned with creating the
spaces for a diverse range of individuals to identify with a flexible and
changeable idea of Britishness, rather than prescribing a normative set of
values that all citizens must adopt.
The British state has opted for this vague and laissez faire-approach to
citizenship because of its grounding in liberal pluralist principles
(Bertossi 2007; Favell 2001; Goulbourne 1991; Siim 2000). Social
harmony and stability are not maintained through a process of individual
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conformity to an abstract notion of citizenship, as some argue is the case in
the French tradition. Rather, social harmony and stability are ensured
when the rights and liberties of the individual are safeguarded in both
private and public spaces. Public space is constructed as a tolerant “free
space” where citizens encounter one another as equals and have the
right and liberty to express their diverse political, social and cultural
beliefs, interests, and identities —with the proviso that this exercise of
rights does not infringe on the rights and liberties of others. With the
emphasis on the sovereignty and plurality of individual citizens, it is
assumed that the state and civil society will be strengthened. With the
free associations of a diverse public supported, better political debate,
representation, and decision making will be promoted. Thus, the
assumption underlying the British idea of citizenship is that liberal
pluralism leads to a stronger and more legitimate democracy
(Goulbourne 1991, 226).
In the context of liberal pluralism, it is clear to see why the incorporation
of multiculturalism, though not without its problems, was the logical next
step for the evolution of British citizenship (Kymlicka 1995; Modood
2007). Multiculturalism protects the individual rights and freedoms of
minority groups and enables these groups to effectively participate in
civil society. Rather than promoting assimilation into the normative
values of a state, as in the French model, the focus in the UK is on
extending the benefits of citizenship to individuals, thus further
strengthening democracy. In contrast to the French model’s concept of
inte´gration, here integration is not necessarily a process of acculturation
but a process of the individual’s self-understanding as a British citizen
and enjoying the rights and responsibilities thus afforded. The right to
liberty is balanced with the responsibility of tolerance for other ways of
doing and being. As Christophe Bertossi (2007, 4) argues:
Instead of using the abstract definition of the individual as a source of
national citizenship, British policy has demonstrated an approach based
on the importance of minority groups and has placed an emphasis on
integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic
values, but as a program of equal access to the rights of British society,
which itself recognizes multiculturalism as a social and political feature.
This idea of liberal pluralism is being increasingly contested, however.
Events ranging from the devolution of decision-making powers from
Westminster to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish administrations
to the 2001 Bradford “race” riots to the 2005 London bombings have
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prompted a popular debate about what it means to be British in the twenty-
first century. After 2001, the Labour government focused renewed efforts
on issues of community cohesion, citizenship, and language tests and for
Muslim groups, in particular, the policy priority of “preventing violent
extremism” (Thomas 2009). These measures have adopted some of the
language usually found in the French model and focus on promoting
civic virtue in terms that proclaim shared British values and active
citizenship (which balances individual freedom with collective
responsibilities).
The Cliche´ in Focus
A growing body of scholarship argues that this opposition is, in fact,
overstated and that convergence, rather than the divergence, can be
observed in key policy fields. Catherine Lloyd discusses the problems of
the “two models” approach, which pits the “individual” model of
relationship between citizen and state, as in France, against the
communitarian or “Anglo-Saxon” model, as exemplified by the United
States and Britain (e.g., Schnapper 1994). Erecting models makes a
rigorous analysis of these contexts more difficult because of an
unresolved slippage between the model as an ideal type and its direct
application in the evaluation of policy, obscuring the complexity of
different forms in each (Lloyd 1995, 39). The two-models approach
obscures similarities across contexts, and the gaps within contexts
between “ideal types,” implementation, and experience (Favell 2001,
45–46; Silverman 1992). Gary Freeman argues that national
incorporation frameworks are not fully cohesive. Because they are
constantly changing, they can at best be described as belonging to a
handful of “loosely connected syndromes” (Freeman 2004). Others
document the contestations within national contexts, critiquing the
“stereotypes” that have obscured realities on the ground through an
overreliance on the “exceptional” character of the French case (Mazur,
Brouard, and Appleton 2008) or the “self-evidently” multicultural nature
of the United Kingdom despite a (contested) retreat to “social cohesion”
and “integration” (see Meer and Modood 2009).1
1. Meer and Modood advance an alternate appraisal of British multiculturalism: Rather than a
“retreat,” they suggest instead that it has been, and continues to be, subject to a productive critique
that is resulting in something best characterized as a ‘civic rebalancing.’”
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These claims that question the opposition between the two models
resonate with our findings, as we discuss in the next sections. We now
turn to explore the fate of intersectional claim making and recognition
in relation to institutional space and policy processes in France and the UK.
THE SEPARATION OF INTE´GRATION AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
IN FRANCE
The 2004 law banning the wearing of religious symbols in public (state)
schools derives from the republican understanding of public space we
discussed previously. The text of the law reaffirms this view (Assemble´e
nationale 2004):
In primary school, middle school and secondary school, the wearing of
symbols or clothing by which a student shows religious belonging
“ostensibly” is forbidden. Internal school regulations require that
application of a disciplinary measure be preceded by dialogue with the
student.
The “Commission for Reflection on the Application of the Principle of
Laı¨cite´ in the Republic,” more commonly named the “Stasi
Commission” after the head commissioner, Bernard Stasi, was created by
French President Jacques Chirac to make concrete recommendations
regarding laı¨cite´, which was, in his words, a “non-negotiable” principle
(Le Monde, “Le Rapport de la Commission Stasi sur la Laı¨cite´,” 12
December, 2003). The report of the commission directly informed the
formulation of the March 2004 law. While the focus was ostensibly on
laı¨cite´ and religion in general, it was in fact on young veiled women of
North African descent. The authors claimed that they heard a “cry for
help” from the “silent majority” of young women of immigrant
backgrounds, victims of pressure from family, neighborhood, and
community. The report sought to protect these young women and to
send a strong sign to extremists (they use the term Islamists) that unequal
treatment of young women would not be tolerated. According to the
authors, the Republic must not remain deaf to this cry of distress. School
must remain for these young women a space of freedom and
emancipation (Commission de re´flexion sur l’application du principe de
laı¨cite´ dans la Re´publique 2003, 58).
There were only two brief half-line references to the possibility that some
young girls or women “wear the headscarf voluntarily” and that the
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headscarf could represent a “personal choice” (Commission de re´flexion
2003, 47, 57). Young Muslim women were predominantly seen as
victims in need of protection, an understanding that translated into the
2004 law.
A “logic of separation”2 was at work in the commission’s report and in the
French government’s formulation of the law. The project of inte´gration
through which individuals voluntarily adhere to the secular values of the
political community and transcend private interests and identities (Costa-
Lascoux 1989; 1999; Favell 2001) was separated from issues of
discrimination. This separation was evident during the hearings of the
commission, when some participants attempted to articulate different,
intersecting claims. Saı¨da Kada, the coauthor of L’une voile´e, l’autre pas
(One veiled, the other not) (Bouzar and Kada 2003) and an activist in
the association French Women and Politically Engaged Muslims,
attempted to break with the logic of separation by asking that
discrimination and economic vulnerability be considered, as well as
oppression within the family/community (Le Monde, “Nadia, Saı¨da et
Fatiha, avec ou sans voile devant la commission Stasi,” 6 December,
2003). Nadia Amiri, a former nurse now pursuing a doctorate in
sociology, took the position opposite to Kada’s with respect to the
headscarf and demanded a ban in all public services of the state.
However, she also asked that discrimination and economic vulnerability
be considered and connected to issues surrounding the headscarf (Le
Monde, “Nadia, Saı¨da et Fatiha”). Finally, the movement Ni Putes, Ni
Soumises (NPNS) (Neither whores nor submissive) fiercely opposed the
headscarf and supported the law banning religious signs in schools as
part of extensive protests against the gendered forms of violence endured
at the hands of men within their communities,3 while also making the
connection to social and economic exclusion in its claims.4 Two leaders
of this movement, Mohamed Abdi and Fadela Amara, gave evidence at
the commission.5
2. For a more detailed discussion see (Bassel 2007).
3. In 2002, Sohane Benziane was burned to death near her home in Vitry sur Seine in the suburbs of
Paris, and other young women have been gang-raped, all of which has been well publicized (Amara and
Zappi 2003; Bellil 2002).
4. This movement is largely made up of women of “immigrant origin” who live in difficult social and
economic conditions in housing estates across France. See Ni Putes, Ni Soumises, which can be
accessed at http://www.niputesnisoumises.com/.
5. In The Politics of the Veil, Joan Scott (2007) emphasizes the conflicting understandings of sexuality
at the heart of the debate, i.e., sexual openness as equivalent to normalcy, and argues that the 2004 law
only exacerbates differences. Rather than focusing on the range of conflicting views, the argument here,
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While Kada defended the wearing of the headscarf, and Amiri and
NPNS opposed it, all three made the connection between issues
surrounding veiling, discrimination, and economic vulnerability.
However, the logic of separation was evident in the way in which the
commission defined the needs of the women in question and in the
French government’s formulation of the March 2004 law. Claims to
address the causes of these forms of violence and broader concerns of
social and economic exclusion were ignored. The need for protection
was considered in isolation, and the only subject position recognized was
of young women as victims of their communities.
The commission’s report made some references to “social” and “urban”
discrimination, with the argument that laı¨cite´ will only have meaning and
legitimacy with e´galite´ des chances (Commission de re´flexion 2003, 52).
However, combating racial and religious intolerance or discrimination
on the basis of one’s place of residence was to be the mandate of a new
entity: the High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for
Equality (HALDE), which was created by the law of December 30,
2004, as a result of the pressure of European Union legislation (the
European Commission directives of 2000 on Racial Equality and
Employment Equality [European Commission, n.d.]). Consequently,
these forms of discrimination were set aside rather than integrated into
analyses of the headscarf, laı¨cite´, and the terms of inclusion in the
political community more broadly.
The nature and significance of this institutional separation of inte´gration
from antidiscrimination require further exploration. What are the
consequences for the recognition of complex claims for equality? As the
following analysis will demonstrate, the process of institutional separation
results in an either/or situation in which either limited claims could be
articulated within the inte´gration-laı¨cite´ debate, as demonstrated
previously, or (limited) claims can be articulated regarding the
application of the existing law. However, laı¨cite´ itself as a principle can
no longer be challenged within the institutional spaces used and created
in the process, nor can women participating in these processes gain
recognition as political subjects. Overall, politics is displaced.6
In order to understand the nature of this separation and the implications
of allocating these issues to the HALDE, its mandate and powers must be
however, focuses on what some seemingly opposite positions have in common: an attempt to articulate
intersections with other forms of discrimination that is silenced.
6. The explicit connection to Bonnie Honig’s (1993) work on the displacement of politics is explored
further in other work.
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investigated further. The powers of the HALDE are primarily restricted to
investigation, and it acts as a lever in implementing the law. It has no
enforcement power and only makes recommendations (and arguably can
mobilize publicity if these are not followed). It is able to make
representations before the courts and also focuses on education
initiatives, particularly with respect to indirect discrimination. Gender
inequality is addressed within this body, though it is not clear that
intersections with other forms of discrimination are explored.7
The institutional separation between inte´gration and antidiscrimination
is not as clear-cut as the report of the Stasi Commission might suggest.
While the laı¨cite´ debate consigns questions of discrimination to the
HALDE, cases relating to laı¨cite´ at the intersection of religion and
gender are, in fact being addressed by the HALDE. However, the
HALDE’s recommendations in these cases are confined to addressing
discriminatory applications of the 2004 law, rather than its content. In
this sense, the HALDE addresses the separate issue of discrimination—
the (mis)application of the 2004 law— and not inte´gration, which
would involve the substance of the law.
In the analysis of relevant deliberations that follows, we can observe that
the HALDE offers a limited form of redress for misapplication of the 2004
law, though this “redress function” is selective and inconsistently applied,
depending on which religious sign is at stake (e.g., the headscarf versus
the burqa). Yet we argue that a more fundamental critique is demanded.
The question of whether the HALDE has “correctly” required that the
misapplication of the law be redressed or deemed that its scope and
intention have been respected in banning a religious sign (as we shall
see in the case of the burqa) is a moot point in more fundamental
political terms.
To support these claims, we discuss 12 relevant deliberations/
recommendations issued by the HALDE between 2006 and 2009
(outlined in Table 1), raising issues of inte´gration and the ways in which
the 2004 law is applied.8 In some instances, women, or associations,
7. This point requires further investigation to situate the French case in comparative literature on the
subject. In single-equality bodies, does an individual have to choose either the gender or ethnic/racial
discrimination stream, for example? And are intersections better recognized and addressed where
multiple bodies exist? However, these questions of institutional design are beyond the scope of this
inquiry, which focuses on policy processes rather than outcomes. For discussion of these issues, see
Bagilhole 2002, O’Cinneide 2002, Squires 2007, and Verloo 2006. We return to this point in the
conclusion of this section.
8. See http://www.halde.fr (retrieved December 3, 2009).
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Table 1. HALDE Deliberations
Deliberation
No.
Subject Recommendation
2006-131 Refusal to allow a woman to enter a naturalization ceremony because she
wears a headscarf
Overruled
2007-117a Exclusion of eight mothers from school activities and from accompanying
class trips because they wear headscarves
Overruled
2006-132 Refused entrance to a courtroom because of wearing a religious sign (turban) Overruled
2006-133 Refusal of a hotel owner to rent a room to a client because she wears a veil Overruled
2008-168 Refusal to allow a woman access to a public training program held in a state
high school because she wears a headscarf
Overruled
2008-194 Refusal by a university professor to allow access to a language course because
the student wears a headscarf
Overruled
2009-22 Response to proposed internal regulation of a company wishing to ban
religious signs
Overruled
2008-32 Response to proposed internal regulation by a supermarket wishing to ban
the wearing of all religious and political signs by employees
Overruled
2006-242 Contract revoked of a woman working with autistic children who refused to
swim with the children (and remove her headscarf)
Upheld, because of security risk to children but
a misapplication of the 2004 law
2008-165 Refusal to allow access to an obligatory language class (Contrat d’accueil et
d’inte´gration) because a headscarf is worn
Overruled
2008-166 Refusal to allow access to an obligatory language program by a public
organization (as part of the Contrat d’accueil et d’inte´gration) because a
headscarf is worn and the course is in a state high school
Overruled
2008-193 Response to consultation by ANAEM regarding the compatibility of
banning the burqa in an obligatory language training program for the
Contrat d’accueil et d’inte´gration
Upheld
aHere the HALDE issued a general deliberation about the principle of laı¨cite´ (2007-117). See: http://www.halde.fr/IMG/pdf/Deliberation_principe_de_laicite_6_
juin_2007.pdf (December 3, 2009).
Information in the Table above contains the author’s translations.
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have taken their cases to the HALDE; in others, businesses/organizations
consulted the HALDE for advice on a practice or regulation.
Of the 12 deliberations examined here, 10 overrule what are deemed to
be discriminatory applications of the 2004 law, and one upholds the
revoked contract of a woman working with autistic children who refused
to swim with the children and remove her headscarf because of the
security risk to the children (2006-242); in only one case was a ban on
wearing a religious sign upheld, in the case of the burqa in an obligatory
language training program (2008-193).
This suggests some possibilities for redress, where social actors are
restricted and reprimanded for interpreting the 2004 law incorrectly.
This redress takes place in a range of ways: in drawing on European
Conventions,9 particularly Article 9 pertaining to freedom of religion,
Article 14 ensuring nondiscrimination, and Protocol 1, Article 2, which
protects the right to education;10 in addressing the problem of “gray
zones,” or internal regulations, where power has been exercised to
exclude women and men from public spaces in ways that would
otherwise fall below the radar (and here the HALDE plays a valuable
role in making these exclusions visible and redrawing the boundaries
“correctly,” that is, consistently with the 2004 law);11 in the careful
insistence that the headscarf alone does not constitute an act of
proselytism, which requires a further act or behavior that causes a
problem with reference to relevant case law;12 and in the reinforcement
not just of where boundaries can be drawn but also who draws them— it
is only the legislator who can determine when considerations of
discrimination can be overridden in cases of disruption of “public
order,” or, in the context of a business, a problem concerning security
and health.
9. The Directive communautaire 2000/78/CE of November 27, 2000, that establishes a general
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation also figures in deliberations.
10. The latter is particularly effective in the cases of recommendations by the HALDE that have
overturned decisions to exclude women wearing headscarves from training programs or language
classes, e.g., 2008-168, 2008-194, 2008-165, and 2008-166 with the notable exception of 2008-193.
11. This form of exclusion is notable in the case of the hotel owner who could not see why the hotel
should be any different from a state school and had devised an internal regulation banning religious
signs, refusing a hotel room to a veiled woman (2006-133). A similar policing of boundaries takes
place in distinguishing between a state school and a university, which is beyond the reach of the law
(2008-194), in overturning proposed internal regulations of a company (2009-22) and a supermarket
wishing to ban religious signs (2008-32), as well as the refusal to allow a man wearing a turban to
enter a courtroom (2006-132).
12. See deliberation 2006-242. The key case stating that the foulard cannot be interpreted as an act of
pressure or proselytism is CE 27 November 1996 M. et Mme Jeouit.
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In sum, the recommendations of the HALDE address discriminatory
applications of the 2004 law. As these examples illustrate, its role
concerns discrimination rather than inte´gration and laı¨cite´ inasmuch as
the substantive content of the latter are not the subject of contention.
Instead, the boundaries of the existing law are policed.
The extent of this policing function can be questioned, and this is a
limited story of redress. In the last three decisions regarding the
Reception and Integration Contract, two bans are overruled when
headscarves are at stake (2008-165, 2008-166), but the third case in
which the National Agency for Reception of Foreigners and Migration
(ANAEM — part of the Office Franc¸ais de l’immigration et de
l’inte´gration) consulted the HALDE regarding the compatibility of
banning the burqa in obligatory language training, the ban was endorsed
by the HALDE (2008-193).
The symbolic and legal stakes in these three cases are high; this contract
is the key piece of the new integration policy, and since January 2007 it has
been obligatory for any person from outside of the European Union who is
either entering France for the first time or has entered legally between the
ages of 16 and 18 and would like to remain in France.13 The purpose of the
contract is to prepare “republican integration” into French society, which
includes a requirement to take free language courses in cases where the
individual is not proficient in French. Failure to attend regularly can
compromise the renewal of one’s residence permit, and attendance must
be proven when renewing the permit. The ANAEM commissions and
finances these training programs from a range of public and private
institutions, and it oversees attendance.
In the two decisions that were overruled, the HALDE rejected the
reasons provided by the language-training providers.14 The training
providers were told to modify internal regulations and to readmit the
students in question. Yet the HALDE shifted its position when it came
to the case of a woman wearing the burqa and attending the same
obligatory language training (2008-193). Here, the HALDE invoked the
case of Faiza M., in which the Council of State upheld immigration
officials’ refusal to grant nationalite´ franc¸aise to a woman in full-body
veil by saying that “she did not meet the conditions of assimilation.”
13. For a description of the contract, see the site of the Office Franc¸ais de l’immigration et de
l’inte´gration at http://www.ofii.fr/article.php3?id_article=63 (accessed December 7, 2009).
14. These reasons included the following: the internal regulation of the school; proximity to state
school students and the need for “equal treatment” of everyone in a school; respect for the public
status of the establishment; and the fight against proselytism.
STRUGGLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL SPACE IN FRANCE AND THE UK 531
According to the Council of State “Mme M . . . adopted a radical practice
of her religion incompatible with the essential values of the French
community, notably with the principle of the equality of the sexes and
thus she does not fulfill the condition of assimilation required by . . .the
Civil Code as a requirement for gaining French nationality.”15 This
Moroccan woman is married to a French man with three children born
in France.
Following this decision, in June 2009 French President Nicholas
Sarkozy declared that women wearing the burqa are “not welcome in
France” and set up a parliamentary commission to determine whether
the burqa poses a threat to the secular nature of the French constitution.
This commission produced a report recommending a partial ban on face
coverings in public services (e.g., hospitals, public administration, school
exits), and these proposals were put to a vote in Parliament (Assemble´e
Nationale 2010). At the time this manuscript was finalized, (October
2010), the law prohibiting “covering (dissimulation) the face in public
space” had been adopted by the lower house in the National Assembly
in July 2010, by the Senate’s vote in September 2010 and, finally,
deemed to be constitutional by the Conseil Constitutionnel in October
2010 with one reservation: the ban must not restrict religious freedom in
sites of worship that are open to the public.16
The HALDE invoked the case of Faiza M. to support the argument that
the burqa is opposed to the values of a democratic society and equality
between the sexes. Therefore, this refusal of French nationality is not a
violation of freedom of religion. Furthermore, in the other two cases
(2008-165, 2008-166), the HALDE had argued that because the training
program is a legal obligation that affects the ability to remain in France,
access should not be restricted. In this deliberation, however, it argued
that the Reception and Integration Contract is precisely the tool through
which foreigners are to prepare their integration into French society and
that the burqa poses a problem in this regard with respect to equality of
the sexes. Indirect discrimination and the disproportionate impact on
women wearing burqas is also no longer a legitimate consideration, in
contrast to the first two decisions. Finally, the rights of others must be
15. See Conseil d’Etat, 27 juin 2008, n8 286798, Faiza M.
16. The law defines public space as made up of “public thoroughfares as well as space open to the
public or dedicated to a public service.” It defines some exceptions to this prohibition and sets a 150
euro maximum fine for cases of violation. The recent decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel 2010-
613 DC at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-
par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/2010-613-dc/communique-de-presse.49712.html (accessed October
12, 2010).
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protected, namely, by shielding other students and the teacher from
pressure. Religious freedom, hitherto protected, is outweighed by other
considerations: Religious freedom is guaranteed so long as public order
is not disturbed, and preserving public order is a constitutional value or
objective. Consequently, individual freedom must be balanced with this
collective good; the requirements of public security and the need to be
able to identify people will not be met. Therefore, the HALDE
concludes, this ban does not violate nondiscrimination principles in
European Convention Articles 9 and 14, and the right to education. The
parliamentary commission, in turn, cited this deliberation by the
HALDE in support of its proposed ban (Assemble´e nationale 2010, 153,
155, 629, 634).
This varied application of the policing function of the HALDE, which is
in turn celebrated by the parliamentary commission, is quite revealing of
the displacement of politics. Certainly, there appears to be little
institutional counterweight or check on this exercise of power in and of
itself. However, a discussion of the justice or injustice of the HALDE’s
deliberations misses the more fundamental critique of the displacement
of politics. The institutional spaces for groups to go beyond simply
challenging the application of the law to contesting the underlying
values of the republican model of citizenship are severely restricted. The
HALDE deliberations provide some limited space for redress that is
selective: It does not apply when the burqa is at stake rather than the
headscarf, or turban. Ultimately, the 2004 law is reinscribed and its
boundaries (selectively) policed.
It could, however, be argued that this is to be expected from a body such
as the HALDE, which ought to perform precisely such a policing function
and no more. The thrust of the critique here, however, is not exclusively
regarding the HALDE in and of itself but of the partitioning of political
space that results in the denial of alternate, multiple subject positions.17
It matters that questions of discrimination are not included in the laı¨cite´
debate, that this separation takes place, which in turn leaves the HALDE
with a (questionable) policing function because separation results in a
closure of the subject position and reduction of the space for the exercise
of agency. In the debate over laı¨cite´, it is only possible to participate as
Muslim women who are victims of the men in their communities, as
opposed to participating who are political agents challenging cultural
and institutional discrimination. Muslim women are only too visible as
17. We are grateful to Tariq Modood for discussion on this point.
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headscarf-wearing victims but are not able to articulate other subject
positions that problematize the separation of these issues and demand
that the laı¨cite´ debate be recast in order to redefine the public sphere
and the nation-state.
THE SEPARATION OF SUBJECT POSITIONS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM: THE CASE OF THE SINGLE EQUALITY BILL
Turning to the operation of institutions in the UK, this section analyzes a
landmark development in antidiscrimination legislation: the Single
Equality Bill. Analysis of the language and proposed institutional
practices of the Equality Bill provides an important insight into how
institutional actors, structures, and practices separate various subject
positions and, in doing so, misrecognize the nature and dynamic of
inequality in the United Kingdom.
Introduced in June 2008 by the then-Labour government, the Single
Equality Bill was its attempt to harmonize recent EU directives
regarding antidiscrimination on the basis of age, sexual orientation,
gender reassignment, religion, and belief with existing UK domestic
antidiscrimination legislation on race, ethnicity, gender, and disability
with regards to employment practices and access to goods, facilities, and
services. For the Equality Bill, one central policy problem is identified.
The bill seeks to “declutter” existing equality law; it proposes a new
instrument in order to integrate the “new” equality strands of sexual
orientation, age, religion, and belief into the existing institutional
framework already in operation for race, ethnicity, gender, and disability.
The Equality Bill is interesting in that it is primarily concerned with the
reorganization of institutional practices, rather than with seeking to reassess
the way the government defines, practices, and enforces equality and
antidiscrimination. For example, when discussing the need for new
legislation, the Government Equalities Office (GEO), which steered
the bill through Parliament under the direction of Harriet Harman, the
former leader of the House of Commons and the current Deputy leader
of the Labour Party, states:
Our discrimination laws have helped us make progress on equality, but
because they have developed over more than 40 years, they have become
extremely complex. . .. The Bill will declutter what has become a thicket
of legislation and guidance (Government Equalities Office 2008, 6).
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The recognition of new forms of discrimination, it seems, has made the
practice of equality more complex and difficult for private and public
bodies, and this prompted the government to develop a new instrument
for measuring multiple forms of equality and discrimination. The so-
called Single Equality Duty will
require public bodies to consider how their policies, programs and services
affect different disadvantaged groups in the community. . .. The new
Equality Duty will be more effective than the existing three separate
duties [on race, gender and disability] because there will be one
streamlined process instead of three different ones (Government
Equalities Office 2008, 13–14).
More specifically, the newDuty will require public bodies to do three things:
have “due regard for the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination,”
promote equal opportunities, and encourage good relations between
different groups (Government Equalities Office 2009a, 85).
Superficially, the government sought to take an intersectional approach to
policy problems and solutions with regards to discrimination. With Labour
previously setting up a single equalities body, the Equality and Human
Rights Commission in 2002, and now with the enactment of the Single
Equality Duty, it seems that this “single equalities approach” might
represent a new emphasis and recognition of intersectional inequalities.18
However, we see instead a continuation of a dominant institutional
process of separating and isolating different subject positions. Treating
these axes as independent and unrelated categories results in the
construction of institutional spaces that misrecognize inequalities and
limit articulation and action to address structural discrimination.
For example, when discussing labor market discrimination, the GEO
constructs the problem in independent and separate spheres of gender,
race, and disability, rather than as a problem that is determined by the
intersections among them:
We know that across the country, there is a full-time pay gap between men
and women of 12.6%; if you are from an ethnic minority you are one-fifth
less likely to find work than if you are white, and if you are disabled you
are two and a half times more likely to be out of work. (Government
Equalities Office 2008, 18)
18. As a result of the May 2010 elections, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government
was formed. The centerpiece of the Coalition is an austerity drive to drastically reduce government
spending. Consequently, at the time of writing, the future of the EHRC and its policy
implementation and regulatory functions is unclear.
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This is a very simplistic construction of labor market discrimination, which
does not accurately represent the intersections among gender, ethnicity,
and disability that structure lived experiences in the workforce. While a
pay gap exists, women’s and men’s ethnicities and class positions
determine it. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, for example, are less
likely to be represented in professional jobs, thus exacerbating income
and wealth inequalities for these groups. Unlike their female
counterparts, black African and black Caribbean men — regardless of
their class positions — are underrepresented in professional occupations
and are more likely to be unemployed or underemployed. While some
ethnic minority groups face discrimination in the labor market, middle-
class Indian and Chinese groups are performing just as well as middle-
class whites (Emejulu 2008). While people with disabilities experience
significant labor market discrimination, these experiences are patterned
on broader attitudes to gender, race, ethnicity, and class (for an extended
discussion of these issues, see Kenway and Palmer 2007; Modood et al.
1997; Pilkington 2003; G. Scott 2008). Thus, in the Single Equality
Bill’s construction of the policy problem of labor market discrimination,
what we see is the misrecognition of important intersectional dynamics
that helps to determine the unequal outcomes for various groups. As a
consequence, the institutional space that is created by this policy
process is highly problematic because “discrete forms of oppression
shape and are shaped by one another, and a failure to recognize this
results in both simplistic analyses and ill-conceived policy interventions”
(Squires 2007, 514).
When discussing the importance of political representation, the Single
Equality Bill again constructs subject positions as separate rather than
relational, stating that “[i]t is important to ensure that Parliament and
our other democratic institutions properly reflect the make-up of our
society, including women as well as men and people from ethnic
minorities” (Government Equalities Office 2008, 28). It seems that we
should assume that the “women” and “men” constructed in the text are
white, while the subject position of “ethnic minorities” appears not to be
gendered. This is surprising given that earlier in the text, the Single
Equality Bill points out that “not a single member of Parliament is an
Asian woman” (p. 27).19
19. At the May 2010 General Election, five Asian women were elected to Parliament, one
representing the Conservative Party and four Labour.
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Although not identical, what we see in the UK is similar to what we
demonstrated in the French case: A logic of separation is at work that
partitions off different social structures and identities, making it difficult
to both articulate intersectional claims and take policy action that might
effectively address intersectional inequalities. With subject positions
assumed to be isolated from one another, it is not clear how
comprehensive action can be undertaken by the institutional space that
is created through the Single Equality Bill to tackle various forms of
intersecting institutionalized discrimination. Part of this logic of
separation stems from the particular way in which campaigners and
policymakers have sought to respond to discrimination in the UK. Since
the first Race Relations Act was passed in 1964, antidiscrimination laws
have implemented homogeneous “group-based remedies” in which race,
gender, disability, and so on were treated as unique and self-contained
phenomena with few links among the different forms of legislation to
create a holistic approach to antidiscrimination for various marginalized
groups (Squires 2007). The Single Equality Bill, despite its language,
does little to challenge or problematize this logic of separation.
Because of this dominant approach to separating different subject
positions, when the issue of intersectionality is discussed, the Single
Equality Bill is unable to respond effectively. For example, when the bill
was first proposed in the summer of 2008, the issue of intersectionality
was constructed as being so complex and difficult that the GEO was
unsure about how to structure the bill in order to address these
problems. For example, when discussing the modernization of the
employment tribunal system, the Equality Bill correctly identifies the
challenge of the intersection of gender and ethnicity in discrimination
cases:
Currently, people can only bring a claim that someone has treated them
unfairly because of one particular characteristic, for example, their race,
sexual orientation or gender. However, there are situations where people
are discriminated against because of a particular combination of
characteristics. For example a black woman may suffer prejudice or
harassment that is not faced by a black man or a white woman. We want
to allow multiple discrimination claims to be brought on combined
multiple grounds. This is a very complex area and we are exploring this
further (Government Equalities Office 2008, 31).
However, after consultation in the summer of 2009, the GEO has included
a new provision within the bill in order to address and respond to issues of
STRUGGLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL SPACE IN FRANCE AND THE UK 537
“multiple discrimination” and intersectionality — but only within the
specific institutional space of the employment tribunal system. The
GEO (2009b, 8) now recognizes that:
[p]eople are complex, with many different characteristics making up who
they are. This can affect the opportunities open to them and how they are
treated. . . . It is increasingly recognized that some people can experience
particular disadvantage because of a combination of protected
characteristics. . . . Currently the law does not always provide a remedy for
an individual who experiences multiple discrimination.
In an attempt to recognize multiple identities and multiple discrimination,
the Single Equality Bill was amended to include a provision for taking
multiple discrimination cases to an employment tribunal. While it is
important not to downplay the significance of this development, there
are real problems embedded in this change. Intersectionality and
multiple discrimination are only recognized in an extremely limited way:
“The provision [to] enable multiple discrimination [is] to be made in
relation to direct discrimination only and combining no more than two
. . .protected characteristics [race, gender, disability, age, religion, sexual
orientation and gender reassignment]” (Government Equalities Office
2009b, 14). In other words, individuals will have a new right to take
multiple discrimination cases to employment tribunals (however, only
for cases of direct discrimination), and they must now choose two parts
of their identity when bringing a case. Thus, intersectionality has been
institutionalized in the UK but in such a way that the institutional space
that has been created appears to undermine the project of recognizing
difference and the multiple claim making of particular groups.
By only recognizing multiple discrimination in the context of direct
discrimination, this bill has the potential to de-emphasize analysis and
action on structural discrimination. UK law states that direct
discrimination is “treating one person less favorably than another on the
grounds of sex, race, disability, sexual orientation, religion/belief, or age”
(EHRC 2010). The Single Equality Bill may seek to protect groups from
multiple forms of discrimination, but it individualizes and ghettoizes
intersectionality by constructing it as a by-product of an isolated incident
of direct discrimination in the workplace. The institutional space for
understanding and practicing intersectionality more broadly as a fusion
of social structures that creates specific social positions that are either
privileged or devalued has been marginalized within the bill. As a result,
the bill appears to weaken the ability of marginalized groups to make
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multiple claims in their interactions with institutional structures. As
Squires (2008, quoting Mabbett 2008, 46) has warned, the logic of
equality developed via judicial mechanisms is limited to an
individualized model of equality, where courts seek to combat
discrimination arising from unfair practices, but are “poorly equipped to
implement a group-based concept of equality and to tackle more
complex structural aspects of discrimination.”
Thus, as we showed in the French case, the spaces for articulating
complex and intersectional justice claims have been extended, but in a
limited sphere that appears to undermine attempts for broader political
and policy recognition and action with regards to intersectional
inequalities. This new provision within the Single Equality Bill is
particularly curious because it contradicts the government’s earlier efforts
to recognize and tackle institutionalized discrimination as set out in the
1999 MacPherson Report and as embedded within the 2001 Race
Relations (Amendment) Act.
Because the bill is primarily concerned with institutional reform, rather
than with rethinking the way it considers equality and antidiscrimination, it
appears to be unable to subvert dominant understandings and treatments of
unequal subject positions, thereby rendering invisible the dynamic
between various subject positions and even misrecognizing the
experiences of a variety of marginalized groups.
CONCLUSIONS: THE LOGIC OF SEPARATION AND LIMITED
INSTITUTIONAL SPACE
In this analysis, we have demonstrated how in ostensibly different contexts
of republican France and the multicultural United Kingdom, a logic of
separation is embedded in various social policy processes that
undermines intersectional claim making by limiting the institutional
space for both recognition and the political struggles of marginalized
groups. When we analyze the different institutional processes in France
and in the UK, we find that institutional actors employ similar (though
not identical) practices in relation to intersections that have similar
outcomes for minority groups on either side of the English Channel.
The nature of this process of institutional separation is different in
France and in the UK. We focused on the mandate of institutions and
the division of space in the French case and on the language of the
Single Equality Bill in the UK, and the same types of intersections have
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not been compared across cases in this article. Instead, a comparison of the
results of within-case analysis has helped us identify the precise nature of
the separation in each case.
Within-case analysis in the UK demonstrates the separation of various
marginalized subject positions through institutional processes and actors
that characterize these axes as independent and unconnected social
phenomena whereas analysis of the French case shows the separation of
inte´gration and antidiscrimination and, consequently, the silencing or
reduction of space for intersecting claims. The point of similarity is the
fact of separation (and the underlying misrecognition) in both cases,
rather than its nature, and this separation can be identified through an
intersectional approach.
InFrance,we sawa “logic of separation,”where issues of discrimination are
separated from those of inte´gration in relation to minority groups. What this
means is that minority religious groups, and in particular Muslim women
who wear the foulard (or headscarf), are unable to make intersecting
claims for social justice while participating in a republican model of
citizenship that does not recognize difference. In many ways, these women
are in a catch-22 where they are accorded the rights of citizenship divested
of difference but cannot make claims for antidiscrimination in the debate
over the nature of citizenship, that is, in debates over inte´gration, because
of the way citizenship in public space in France is defined. The “cost”
here is the reduction of the space for voice: Intersecting, agonistic
challenges cannot be articulated in the debate that defines the French
Republic, precisely where the nation is being challenged. Instead, the
available options are those of being a victim or being invisible. The
alternative body, the HALDE, which handles antidiscrimination, provides
limited (and arbitrary) scope for challenging dominant notions of
victimhood because of its policing function and selective redress in its
recommendations regarding the application of the existing 2004 law. The
result is the restriction of the struggle over institutional space, particularly
the attempt to redefine the nature of this space.
In the UK, the process of separation is different. In defining policy
problems in relation to equality, institutional actors separate subject
positions and define them as independent and static social categories.
Thus, what we see is women and men defined without ethnicity (or
sexuality, class, disability, and age) and minority ethnic groups that are not
gendered (or classed, disabled, sexed, or aged). In addition, in the name of
intersectionality and multiple identities, we also see individuals having to
arbitrarily choose portions of their identity in order to seek justice for direct
540 LEAH BASSEL AND AKWUGO EMEJULU
discrimination. The result is that the potential of intersectional social-justice
claim making within the context of the institutional space created by the
Single Equality Bill is drastically curtailed. Ironically, in the name of
equality and intersectionality, this policy process actually reduces the space
for practicing this form of politics. As a consequence of this separation,
there is a real danger of implementing misguided policy programs that do
not effectively address the realities of discriminatory practice or respond to
the social justice claims of various groups.
By analyzing intersectionality in relation to institutional practices, we are
able to identify this similarity while still recognizing variations in its
particular manifestation in each case. Despite the different contexts and
histories of identity formation, we are able to examine how the policy
processes of institutional actors can undermine minority ethnic groups’
abilities to make simultaneous social justice claims, and how the interests
and experiences of minority ethnic groups can be misrecognized in the
policymaking process. This is possible by defining intersectionality in
relation to social structures and institutions rather than identity.
Consequently, the perception and treatment of difference by institutional
actors is brought to the fore, rather than the nature of difference itself.
Recognizing and creating space for difference is a highly complex
practice. From our analysis, the question remains as to whether it is
possible to have an open-ended process that recognizes and
accommodates a diverse array of subject positions. We think it is
possible, and the process must first be grounded in democratic politics.
As we have demonstrated in both France and the UK, the way in which
groups are constructed in social policy discourses matters inasmuch as it
sets the context for understanding minority ethnic women and men as
active subjects and authors of their lives and experiences. Creating spaces
for groups to define their experiences and their interests for themselves
goes a long way to recognizing difference. This democratic politics can
then be mapped on the policymaking process, whereby the voices and
experiences of groups inform and are embedded in policymaking.
Indeed, as we have seen in both the UK and France, when claims are
ignored (as in the Stasi Commission) or when some forms of
discrimination are arbitrarily selected as composing the intersections that
matter (as in the Single Equality Bill), policy outcomes are at best
problematic and at worst undermine the raison d’eˆtre of the policy.
Opening up the policy process— by creating the institutional space for
democratic politics —may help to create better social policy and may
help to democratize decision making on social justice issues.
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